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BROKEN RECORD: REVISITING THE FLAWS IN
SONY'S FAIR USE ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF THE
GROKSTER DECISION
By David L. Wardle*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court dramatically altered the
evolution of American entertainment in the controversial case of Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.' In a 5-4 decision, the
Court held that off-the-air recording of copyrighted television programs
does not violate U.S. copyright laws.2 This past summer, the Court raised
the specter of the Sony decision when it unanimously held, in MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. , that the "staple article of commerce"
defense that shielded Sony, supplier of the Betamax videotape recorder
(VTR), from contributory copyright infringement liability in Sony would
not shield Grokster and StreamCast, suppliers of digital file sharing
software, from contributory copyright infringement liability in Grokster.
The Court attempted to reconcile the inconsistent outcomes of the Grokster
and Sony cases by noting that the Grokster defendants acted with intent to
induce copyright infringement, while no such intent had been attributed to
the defendants in Sony.4 This distinction has caused some to ask, "Does
this new opinion mean that if Sony's heart had not been pure, we would
have lost the VCR?
',5
* Associate, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP; B.S. 1999, Brigham Young
University; J.D. 2002, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
1. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) [hereinafter Sony
III1.
2. Brooks Boliek, Fast Forward: The Betamax Case Remains a Benchmark for Lawmakers
Confronting New Technologies, HOLLYWOOD REP., June 23, 2005, at S-I.
3. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) [hereinafter Grokster III].
4. See id. at 2726 ("[T]his case is significantly different from Sony .... Here, evidence of
the distributors' words and deeds... shows a purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of
copyright infringement."); id. 2777 ("There was no evidence that Sony had expressed an object of
bringing about taping in violation of copyright or had taken active steps to increase its profits
from unlawful taping.").
5. Wendy J. Gordon, Prof., Boston Univ., Remarks at the Meeting of the Boston Bar Ass'n:
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The difference between the Sony and Grokster cases cannot be wholly
explained by a difference in the defendants' hearts, pure or otherwise.
Under the standard articulated in Grokster for finding intent to induce
infringement, the Sony Court could have held that it was Sony's intent to
induce copyright infringement but for the Court's own finding that off-the-
air recording of copyrighted television programs is a fair use of copyrighted
material. What really explains the inconsistent outcomes of the Sony and
Grokster cases is the fact that the Supreme Court's fair use analysis in Sony
is flawed.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW FRAMEWORK
Article 1, Section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution
empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 6  The government grants
authors and inventors limited monopoly rights, in the form of copyrights7
for artistic expressions and patents8 for inventions, thereby creating an
incentive for authors and inventors to benefit the public with their
contributions to the arts and sciences. 9 Although these limited monopoly
rights directly benefit copyright and patent holders, the objective of
intellectual property law is improvement of public welfare, not
compensation of authors and inventors.'
0
MGM v. Grokster: What It Holds and What It All Means (June 29, 2005).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with [the
Copyright Act], in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.").
8. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of [the Patent Act].")
9. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'), overturned on other grounds by statute as
stated in Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1983).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 2222-60, at 7 (1909) (stating that copyright laws are intended
primarily for the public benefit); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.").
BROKEN RECORD
A. The Incentive to Create Has Increased as the Scope and Duration of the
Limited Monopoly Rights Granted to Copyright Holders Have Expanded.
Striking the proper balance between providing public access to
articles of "Science and useful Arts"" and providing the incentives
necessary to induce private individuals to create such public goods is
difficult. When Congress. enacted the first federal copyright statute in
1790, it only protected the rights of authors to print, reprint, publish, and
vend maps, charts, and books for an initial term of 14 years, renewable for
another 14 year term if the author was still living. 12 Today, the Copyright
Act ("Act") grants authors exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute,
perform, display, and propound derivates of their creations.' 3 Copyright
protection now extends to literary, musical, dramatic, pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works, pantomimes and choreography, motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architectural works.
14
Under the present scheme, a copyright lasts for the term of the author's life
plus 70 years. In the case of anonymous works, copyrights extend 95 years
from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first. 15
B. Courts Recognize a Privilege of Fair Use to Prevent Overreaching by
Copyright Holders.
As early as 1841, courts began excepting certain "justifiable" uses of
copyrighted works from the statutory monopoly granted to the copyright
holder, even though these uses fell within the scope of the copyright
holder's exclusive rights under a literal reading of the Copyright Act.' 6 In
Folsom v. Marsh,17 Justice Joseph Story, writing for the Federal Circuit
Court in Massachusetts, 18 recognized a "fair and bona fide abridgment"
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. See Act ofMay 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 § 1 (repealed 1802).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
14. See Id. § 102.
15. See Id. § 302.
16. See Sony IIl, supra note 1, at 475 n.27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the genesis
of the fair use defense in American jurisprudence).
17. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
18. See Arthur E. Sutherland, Introduction to JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.constitution.org/js/js_001.htm (last visited
July 19, 2005) ("The work of the Supreme Court itself was much lighter in 1811 than it is now,
but the individual justices were then required to go on circuit in various parts of the United States,
where, as circuit justices, they presided over trials in the circuit courts and heard appeals from the
federal district courts. Thus Story not only sat on the Supreme Court in Washington several
months each year, but he also held circuit courts in New Hampshire, Massachusetts... and
Rhode Island.").
2005]
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exception that allowed a reviewer to "fairly cite largely from the original
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes
of fair and reasonable criticism."1 9 In determining the reasonableness of
the reviewer's purpose, Justice Story considered such factors as "the nature
and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish
the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.",20 This judicially
created "privilege of fair use"21 was codified by Congress as Section 107 of
the Copyright Act in 1976.22 Congress "intended to restate the [then
existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in
any way."7
23
Section 107 states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work.., for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. '24 In determining whether or not a use is "fair,"
a court must consider the following non-exclusive list of factors, which
closely resembles the list of factors considered by Justice Story in 1841:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.25
C. Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement May Be Imposed to
Protect the Incentive to Create.
Another judicially developed doctrine impacting copyright law is
secondary liability for copyright infringement. While the Copyright Act
itself does not impose liability on indirect infringers, the courts have taken
the position that the absence of express secondary liability language in the
19. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344.
20. Id. at 348.
21. See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
23. Sony III, supra note 1, at 447-48 n.29 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); see
also William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1659,
1662-63 (1988).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
25. Id.
BROKEN RECORD
statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright
infringement on certain parties who have not directly engaged in infringing
26activity. Common law secondary liability concepts that courts have
applied to copyright cases include vicarious liability for infringement and
contributory infringement.
1. Vicarious Liability May Be Imposed on One Who Profits from
Copyright Infringement and Declines to Exercise a Right to Prevent Such
Infringement.
One vicariously infringes a copyright by "profiting from direct
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it. ' '27 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the concept of vicarious
liability as "an 'outgrowth' of respondeat superior," because, "[i]n the
context of copyright law, vicarious liability extends beyond an
employer/employee relationship to cases in which a defendant 'has the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct
financial interest in such activities.'' 28 For those who profit from
infringement that is within their purveyance to police, liability may not be
avoided simply by turning a blind eye to the infringement. 29 However,
without the right and ability to supervise infringing activity, no obligation
to police arises.
2. Contributory Liability May Be Imposed on One Who Knowingly
Enables or Encourages Copyright Infringement by Others.
One contributes to copyright infringement by "intentionally inducing
or encouraging direct infringement. 30  Like vicarious liability, the concept
of contributory liability holds one accountable for the copyright
infringement of another. One oft-cited statement of the contributory
infringement rule is that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
26. Sony III, supra note 1, at 435; see also Grokster IlL supra note 3, at 2776 ("doctrines of
secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law"
(citing Sony II1, supra note 1, at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
27. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2776 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.,
316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
28. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)).
29. Id. at 1023.
30. Grokster 11, supra note 3, at 2776 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgrnt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
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of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer.",
3'
For the purposes of contributory infringement, knowledge of
infringement may be actual or constructive. 32  Where constructive
knowledge arises solely from the distribution of a "staple article or
commodity of commerce, 33 the defendant may rebut a presumption of
knowledge with a showing that the article is capable of some substantial,
noninfringing use.34 Inducement of infringement may be found where one
"distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement. 35 One is found to cause infringement when one is "in
a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and
[authorizes] the use without permission from the copyright owner.
36
Material contribution to infringement occurs when one provides the means
for infringing activity, such as a "site and facilities. 37
III. EXAMINING THE GROKSTER CASE
A. A Look at the Grokster and StreamCast Software Used to Make
Unauthorized Copies of Copyrighted Works.
The copyright infringement at issue in Grokster was facilitated by
technology that operated in a manner "conceptually analogous" to the
technology that was the subject of an earlier case from the same circuit, A
& M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.38 Because of the close factual
relationship between the two cases,39 it is instructive to have some
familiarity with Napster before examining Grokster.
31. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
32. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 487 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[A] finding of
contributory infringement has never depended on actual knowledge of particular instances of
infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant have reason to know that infringement is taking
place.").
33. Id. at 440; see infra note 137.
34. See Sony IIL supra note 1, at 440-42.
35. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2770.
36. Sony III, supra note 1, at 437 & n.18 (contrasting the "dance hall cases" where
secondary liability was not imposed on account of a defendant's lack of control of others' use of
copyrighted works).
37. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
38. Id. at 1004.
39. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
[hereinafter Grokster 1] ("Although novel in important respects, both the Grokster and Morpheus
platforms operate in a manner conceptually analogous to the Napster system .. "), aff'd, 380 F.
3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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1. Napster.
In the fall of 1998, Shawn Fanning, an 18-year-old student from
Harwick, Massachusetts, started college at Northeastern University in
Boston with the intention of studying computer science. 40 Bored with his
schoolwork, Fanning began looking for new programming challenges.41
One of his roommates regularly downloaded digital copies of his favorite
music from the Internet, but was frustrated with the unreliability of the
websites providing music files.42  It was difficult to locate websites that
offered downloadable music files, and those websites that did provide
music files were not well maintained.43  Intrigued by his roommate's
dilemma, Fanning set out to devise a real-time system for locating digital
audio files in MP344 format on the hard drives of other computers
connected to the Internet.45
Fanning's idea was to have several Internet users list MP3 files that
they were willing to share on an indexing computer accessible to other
Internet users.46  He created a software program-utilizing peer-to-peer
("P2P") file sharing technology-that allowed users to connect and share
MP3 files stored on one anothers' computers.47 Fanning dubbed the
program "Napster," and introduced the program to friends, who received
the program enthusiastically. With the help of his uncle, Fanning formed a
company and released the Napster software to the public in the summer of
40. Utah's Digital Economy and the Future: Peer-to-peer and Other Emerging
Technologies Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (2000) (testimony of Shawn
Fanning, Founder, Napster, Inc.) http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=199&witid=273




44. In 1987, the Moving Picture Experts Group developed an audio file format known as
"MPEG-3," or "MP3." The MP3 file format compresses digital audio files. The compressed files
have lower audio quality than a regular compact disc, but they have become the standard for
transmitting music over the Internet because they require minimal disk space, memory, and
transmission time. Most MP3 files are created by consumers, who copy the files off of compact
discs in a process called "ripping." See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, Napster, Inc. v. A &
M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9 t' Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-16401 & 00-16403),
http://news.fmdlaw.com/cnn/docs/napster/napster/briefl)8l8.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
45. See Utah 's Digital Economy and the Future: Peer-to-peer and Other Emerging
Technologies Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (2000) (testimony of Shawn
Fanning, Founder, Napster, Inc.) http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=199&witid=273
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1999.48 With word of his new program spreading quickly, Napster's client
base soon grew to several million users.
Although P2P technology can facilitate sharing of almost any type of
file, Napster's primary attraction was that it enabled users to swap digital
copies of music files for free. However, not everyone welcomed this new
method of obtaining free music. The copyright owners of much of the
music asserted that their exclusive rights to copy and distribute the music
were being infringed by file sharing Napster users. Record companies-
owners of the copyrights to most popular music-sued Napster for
copyright infringement, claiming that nearly ninety percent of the music
files shared on Napster were pirated.49 They characterized Napster as "a
business created to facilitate the anonymous theft of music," and presented
evidence that music file sharing through Napster led to decreased music
sales. Napster's service was ultimately shut down after the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's findings that record
companies had "demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of
[their] contributory copyright infringement claim."50  The court held
Napster had knowingly and materially contributed to the infringing activity
of its users by indexing shared files and hosting file searches on its
servers.
51
2. Grokster is Conceptually Analogous to Napster.
Just as Napster's legal woes were threatening to put an end to digital
music file swapping, a number of new entities introduced their own P2P
platforms on the Internet. These entities offered the free exchange of not
only copyrighted music, but also copyrighted movies and other digital
media, each marketing itself as "the next Napster." Three of these
entities--Grokster, Ltd., StreamCast Networks, Inc., and KaZaa BV
("KaZaa")-soon found themselves the targets of lawsuits. A default
judgment was entered against KaZaa, whose founders developed
"FastTrack," the technology originally used by all three defendants.
52
Grokster and StreamCast successfully defended themselves against the
plaintiffs' suit in Central District of California and in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals before receiving an adverse ruling from the United States
48. Id.
49. See Respondent's Brief at 5, A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc, 239 F.3d 1004 (9
h
Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-16401 & 00-16403) (Nov. 27, 2000).
50. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
51. Id.
52. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter Grokster fl], vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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Supreme Court.53
The facts of Grokster are similar to those of Napster; Grokster and
StreamCast both distributed free software to users who downloaded the
software onto their own computers from servers operated by the
defendants. 54 Once installed, both Grokster's FastTrack-based "Grokster"
software and StreamCast's "Morpheus" software, based on "Gnutella"
open source code, enabled users to search networks of shared digital files
while simultaneously making the user's own shared files available to other
users of the same network.55 As with the Napster system, the exchange of
digital files occurred directly from one user's computer to another's
computer.
56
The critical distinction between the facts of Grokster and Napster is
that the Napster network was centralized and operated by Napster, whereas
in Grokster the FastTrack and Gnutella networks were decentralized.
57
Because of this decentralization, users of Grokster and Morpheus software
could continue sharing files through the FastTrack and Gnutella networks,
respectively, even if Grokster and StreamCast deactivated all computers
within their respective control. Conversely, if Napster deactivated its
computers, its users would be unable to share files through the Napster
network.58 Despite the fact that Grokster and StreamCast did not provide
the "site and facilities" for illicit file swapping, the Supreme Court
nonetheless found "substantial evidence in [the plaintiffs] favor" on the
contributory infringement claim.59  The Court found the Grokster
defendants possessed "unmistakable" intent to induce copyright
infringement.6°
B. Grokster and Stream Cast Could Be Held Liable for Contributory
Copyright Infringement.
Grokster and StreamCast could be held liable for contributory
copyright infringement because their own knowledge and actions made
53. See Grokster I, supra note 3, at 2782-83.




58. See id. at 1041 ("If either Defendant closed their doors and deactivated all computers
within their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no
interruption." In contrast, "[i]fNapster deactivated its computers, users would no longer be able
to share files through the Napster network.").
59. See Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2782.
60. See id.
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them answerable for the direct copyright infringement of those who used
Grokster and Morpheus software.
61
1. Users of Grokster and Morpheus Software Used the Software to
Commit Acts of Direct Copyright Infringement.
A claim of direct copyright infringement must be supported by two
elements: ownership and infringement.62  The complainant must first
establish that it holds a valid copyright, and then demonstrate that one of
the exclusive rights granted by that copyright has been infringed.63 In the
Grokster case, Grokster and StreamCast settled the question of ownership
by conceding that the plaintiffs owned the rights to the sound recordings
that were the subject of the complaint.64 The Grokster defendants also
conceded that, like the users of the Napster software before them, at least
some of the users of Grokster and Morpheus software engaged in activity
that violated two of the plaintiffs' exclusive rights in their sound
recordings-the right of reproduction and the right of distribution.65
Significantly, it was undisputed by the plaintiffs that there were also
"substantial noninfringing uses" for Grokster and Morpheus software.66
2. Grokster and StreamCast Could Be Held Liable for the Infringing
Activity of Grokster and Morpheus Software Users.
Having established that users of Grokster and Morpheus software
directly infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights, the Grokster plaintiffs brought
claims of secondary liability under both vicarious liability and contributory
infringement theories.67 Ultimately, the plaintiffs obtained a favorable
61. See id. at 2782 ("[I]n addition to intent to bring about infringement and distribution of a
device suitable for infringing use, the inducement theory of course requires evidence of actual
infringement by recipients of the device ....").
62. See Groksterl, supra note 39, at 1034.
63. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Plaintiffs
must satisfy two requirements to present a prima facie case of direct infringement: (1) they must
show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that the alleged
infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106.").
64. Grokster, supra note 39, at 1034.
65. Id. at 1034-35 ("[lIt is undisputed that at least some of the individuals who use
Defendants' software are engaged in direct copyright infringement of Plaintiffs copyrighted
works.... Just as in Napster, many of those who use Defendants' software... infringe
Plaintiffs' rights of reproduction and distribution.").
66. See id. at 1036.
67. Id. at 1034.
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ruling from the Supreme Court on the contributory infringement claim.
68
The Supreme Court declined to address MGM's vicarious liability claim.
69
In order for one party to be vicariously liable for the direct copyright
infringement of another, it must have both a financial interest in the
infringing activity and the ability to police that activity.70 The trial court in
Grokster found that Grokster and StreamCast had a clear financial interest
in the copyright infringing conduct of the users of their software; the
defendants derived substantial advertising revenue from the operation of
websites that drew visitors looking to trade copyrighted sound recordings
using the defendants' software. 7' Because Grokster and StreamCast lacked
the ability to supervise the infringing conduct of the users of their software,
the trial court found that vicarious liability could not be imposed,72 a
finding that was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
73
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that Grokster and StreamCast could
be contributorily liable for the infringing activity of their users because
they knew of and induced such activity.74
In contrast to vicarious liability, contributory liability requires
knowledge of the infringing activity, and inducement, causation, or
material contribution to the infringing activity.75 The first element,
knowledge, was easily established in the Grokster case. The evidence
showed that: (1) "both Defendants marketed themselves as 'the next
Napster'," 76 (2) the defendants' executives had used the software to search
for digital copies of copyrighted sound recordings, (3) the plaintiffs had
repeatedly notified the defendants of the infringing use of their software,
and (4) the defendants were otherwise aware of the infringing use being
made of their software.77 This evidence supported, at the very least,
constructive knowledge that Grokster and Morpheus software was used to
68. Grokster IlL supra note 3, at 2782.
69. Id. at 2776 n.9; but see MGM II, supra note 52, at 1164-66 (stating that the vicarious
liability claim was not met because the third element-"the right and ability to supervise"-was
not satisfied).
70. Grokster I supra note 52, at 1164-66; Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2776 ("One ...
infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to
stop or limit it.").
71. Groksterl, supra note 39, at 1043-44.
72. See id. at 1045 (stating that the court found no admissible evidence indicating the
defendants' ability to supervise and control the infringing conduct).
73. See Grokster II, supra note 52, at 1166.
74. See Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2782.
75. Sony I1, supra note 1, at 487.
76. See Grokster I, supra note 39, at 1036.
77. See id.
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infringe on copyrights.78
The Supreme Court ultimately held that evidence presented in the
Grokster case also supported a finding that Grokster and StreamCast "acted
with a purpose to cause copyright violations by use of software suitable for
illegal use."79 Of the evidence presented in the case, the Court highlighted
three features in particular that proved Grokster and StreamCast acted with
actual intent to induce copyright infringement. First, the defendants
attempted to "satisfy a known source of demand for copyright
infringement, the market comprising former Napster users., 80 Second, they
intentionally facilitated the copyright infringing activity of others by
providing software that enabled infringement without taking preventative
steps to curtail the known infringing uses. 81  Third, both companies
operated on business models that depended on high-volume use of their
respective software.82 In light of these considerations, the Court declared
the defendants' unlawful objective to be "unmistakable. 83 Having found
that Grokster and StreamCast not only knew of the infringing use of
Grokster and Morpheus software, but also induced users to put the software
to such use, the Supreme Court declared there was "substantial evidence in
[the plaintiffs'] favor" to support a contributory infringement claim.
84
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF THE SONY CASE IN LIGHT OF THE GROKSTER
DECISION
A. Sony Distributed Equipment That Was Used to Make Unauthorized
Copies of Copyrighted Works.
As early as 1965, Sony Corporation of America began manufacturing
videotape recorders ("VTRs") that could be used together with other
equipment to record and replay televised broadcasts of audiovisual
material.85 Sony eventually developed a line of Betamax VTRs that
78. See id. at 1037 ("Defendants clearly know that many if not most of those individuals
who download their software subsequently use it to infringe copyrights.").
79. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2781.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 2781-82. "Since the extent of the software's use determines the gain to the
distributors, the commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use, which the record
shows is infriinging." Id. at 2782.
83. Id. at 2782.
84. Id.
85. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (C.D. Cal.
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contained all of the components necessary for recording television
broadcasts without requiring additional equipment.86 Some Betamax VTRs
were also equipped with timers, which allowed the user to record a telecast
when not physically present at the time of broadcasting, or even while
watching television on another channel.87 Betamax VTRs were capable of
pausing, fast forwarding, and rewinding the recorded material on the
cassette tape. 88 These features enabled the user to both avoid recording an
undesired segment of a televised program and avoid watching an undesired
program segment during playback.89 Use of the Betamax VTR was not
limited to the recording of telecasts; the Betamax was also capable of
recording signals from a video camera, which could be played back on a
monitor.90 This allowed the user to create his or her own audiovisual
material, such as home movies, for playback on a television monitor.9'
None of the Betamax machines or promotional materials contained
any warnings about copyright infringement. 92  However, a booklet of
operating instructions distributed with each Betamax VTR sold included
the following warning: "Television programs, films, videotapes and other
materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of such material
may be contrary to the provisions of the United States copyright laws."
93
Sony had no contact with Betamax users after the point of sale.94
In 1976, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions, two
studios that had produced programs recorded off-the-air by private
individuals using Sony's Betamax line of VTRs, filed a lawsuit against
Sony to enjoin its sale of the Betamax VTR. Although television viewers
were invited to enjoy the network telecast of programs produced by
Universal and Disney free of charge,95 Universal and Disney derived
revenue from the licensing of audiovisual programs to networks for
television broadcast.96 The networks, in turn, derived their revenue
1979) [hereinafter Sony 1] (noting that Sony also manufactured the other equipment used to
record and play the broadcasts, including the special tape), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981),




89. See id. at 435-36.
90. Id. at 436.
91. See Sony , supra note 85, at 436.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 460.
95. See id. at 442.
96. See id. at 433-35.
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primarily from advertisers who paid to have commercials telecast with
programming produced by companies like Universal and Disney.97 The
advertising fees that the networks received from the advertisers and the
licensing fees that the studios in turn received from the networks were
"influenced substantially by the size ... of the audience which the
programs... [were] expected to reach. 98  Independent audience
measuring services measured the reach of a telecast but did not include any
measure of videotape recording or playback in their calculation of telecast
reach.99 At the time of the lawsuit, Universal and Disney were also selling
audiovisual recordings of some of their copyrighted works for home
viewing.100
Although the trial court was unpersuaded, Universal and Disney
argued that allowing VTR users to make unauthorized recordings of their
telecast programs would harm the studios in at least two significant
ways. 10 First, allowing VTR users to record telecasts of the studios'
copyrighted works for later viewing could reduce the live viewership that
supported the advertising fees relied on by the networks for revenue.
10 2
Second, allowing VTR users to make unauthorized copies of the studios'
copyrighted works would reduce demand for authorized copies of the same,
thereby interfering with the studios' entry into the burgeoning home video
market. 10 3 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs' claim
that Sony, as the manufacturer of the VTRs, was liable for contributory
copyright infringement.' °4 However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit decision, holding that off-the-air recording for home use was not an
infringement. 0 5  The Court refused to hold Sony liable for the direct
copyright infringement of Betamax users.
106
97. See Sony I, supra note 85, at 440.
98. Id. at 440-41.
99. See id. at 441 (noting that Nielsen and Arbitron, the two audience measuring services,
had the capability of measuring "information with respect to videotape recorder usage," but
neither measured such data at the time of the trial).
100. See id. at 433-34.
101. Id. at 466-67.
102. See id. at 466 (noting that the court labels this the time-shifting claim).
103. See Sony I, supra note 85, at 467 (noting that the court labels this as another time-
shifting claim).
104. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975-76 (9th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter Sony II], rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
105. Sony III, supra note 1, at 456 ("The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial
noninfringing uses. Sony's sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute
contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights.").
106. See Grokster IlL supra note 3, at 2777 ("Although Sony's advertisements urged
consumers to buy the VCR to 'record favorite shows' or 'build a library' of recorded
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B. If the Court Had Found the Challenged Use of Sony's Betamax VTR to
Constitute Infringement, Sony Could Have Been Liable for Contributory
Copyright Infringement Under the Grokster Standard.
Sony, Grokster, and StreamCast all faced claims of secondary liability
for copyright infringement. While Grokster and StreamCast faced adverse
rulings,'0 7 the Court ruled in favor of Sony. 10 8 Although the Grokster and
Sony cases are factually similar, the Court distinguished the Sony case
based on its application of the contributory infringement rule.109 However,
the Court's definitive finding was that the use of VTRs to make
unauthorized copies of televised audiovisual material for personal
consumptive use did not infringe the copyrights held by the owners." 0
1. Sony Was Not Vicariously Liable for the Copyright Infringement of
VTR Users.
The trial court in Sony correctly applied the vicarious liability
standard. This standard requires evidence of a financial benefit derived
from the infringing use and a right and ability to control that use."' The
Court found that Sony had no financial interest in the VTR's use because
Sony derived the same financial benefit from the sale of a VTR whether or
not it was put to infringing use.112 Yet, the Court may draw the same
conclusion for both Grokster and StreamCast. While their advertising
revenue directly correlated to the number of individuals who downloaded
Grokster and Morpheus software, the financial benefit was the same
whether used for lawful or unlawful purposes."
3
programs... neither of these uses was necessarily infringing") (citations omitted) (quoting Sony
III, supra note 1, at 459).
107. See id. at 2782 ("There is substantial evidence in MGM's favor on all elements of
inducement ... ").
108. Sony III, supra note 1, at 456 ("Sony's sale of [the Betamax] to the general public
does not constitute contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights.").
109. See Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2782 ("[T]his case is significantly different from
Sony .... Sony dealt with a claim of liability based solely on distributing a product with
alternative lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge that some users would follow the unlawful
course .... Here, evidence of the distributors' words and deeds going beyond distribution as
such shows a purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright infringement.").
110. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 456.
111. See Sony I, supra note 85, at 461 ("Vicarious liability can be imposed when a party
has the 'right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest
in such activities."') (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
112. Id.
113. See Grokster I, supra note 39, at 1043,1044 ("[T]he users ...can and do choose to
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In Grokster, the trial court found that many Grokster and Morpheus
software users downloaded the defendants' software specifically because it
could be put to an infringing use. Consequently, the infringing activity was
a source of revenue to the defendants. Therefore, they had a financial
interest in the infringing use of the software they distributed. 114 The Court
confirmed that Grokster and StreamCast were secondarily liable because
their commercial success was contingent upon their software's high-
volume use.
Because Sony's revenue was derived directly from product sales
rather than advertising, it derived a financial benefit solely from the sale of
its VTRs. 1 5 Assuming the Betamax use was infringing, Sony would have
a financial interest in the infringing use under the Grokster and StreamCast
holding. However, the court in Sony said, "Selling a staple article of
commerce ... technically contributes to any infringing use subsequently
made thereof, but this kind of 'contribution,' if deemed sufficient as a basis
for liability, would expand the theory beyond precedent and arguably
beyond judicial management."
' 16
Regardless of whether Sony benefited from an infringing use of the
Betamax VTR, Sony was not liable for vicarious copyright infringement
because it lacked the right and ability to control how consumers used its
VTRs. 117 The only meaningful contact that Sony had with its VTR users
ended at the point of sale. 1 8 Without more, Sony was not secondarily
liable for the direct copyright infringement of Betamax users on a vicarious
infringement theory." 9
employ it for both lawful and unlawful ends ... The more individuals who download the
software, the more advertising revenue Defendants collect.").
114. See id. ("The ability to trade copyrighted songs and other copyrighted works certainly
is a 'draw' for many users of Defendants' software.... And because a substantial number of
users download the software to acquire copyrighted material, a significant proportion of
Defendants' advertising revenue depends upon the infringement. Defendants thus derive a
financial benefit from the infringement.").
115. See Sony L supra note 85, at 435 ("[The Betamax] recorders range in price from
approximately $875-$1000. Sony also manufactures and sells tape cassettes for the various
Betamax models .... The price for [a] 3-hour tape is approximately $21 .").
116. Id. at 461.
117. See id. ("Here defendants have neither the right nor the ability to control Betamax
purchasers' use of the machines in their homes ... ").
118. Sony I, supra note 1, at 438 ("The only contact between Sony and the users of the
Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred at the moment of sale.").
119. See id. at 439 ("If vicarious liability is to be imposed on [Sony] in this case, it must rest
on the fact that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that [its] customers
may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. There is no
precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory. The
closest analogy is provided by the patent law cases to which it is appropriate to refer because of
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2. Sony Could Have Been Liable for Contributory Copyright
Infringement.
If the Sony court determined that making unauthorized off-the-air
recordings of copyrighted television programs with a Betamax VTR was an
infringing activity, it could have held Sony liable for contributory copyright
infringement. The court could have based this on a material contribution
theory and almost certainly on an inducement of infringement theory.
The district court found that Sony was not liable for contributory
infringement because it lacked sufficient knowledge of the infringing use
of its Betamax VTR. 120  The court came to this conclusion even though:
(1) national advertisements for the Betamax encouraged prospective
purchasers to "record favorite shows," "build a library," and record "novels
for television" and "classic movies"; 121 (2) Betamax salesmen made off-
the-air recordings of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works and replayed the
same as part of their sales pitch; 122 and (3) Betamax operating instructions
conceded that unauthorized recording of telecasts "may be contrary to the
provisions of the United States copyright laws.' 23  However, if
unauthorized off-the-air recording for home use had been determined to be
infringement, Sony's clear knowledge of this would have satisfied the
knowledge element for contributory copyright infringement.
As recognized in the Sony dissent, constructive knowledge of direct
infringement satisfies the knowledge element for contributory copyright
infringement. The dissent stated that mere reason to know of direct
infringement was sufficient. 124 To its credit, the trial court in Sony assumed
in its analysis that Sony had constructive knowledge of the VTR's use to
the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.").
120. See Sony I, supra note 85, at 459 ("This court agrees with defendants that their
knowledge was insufficient to make them contributory infringers.").
121. See id. at 436.
122. See id. at 439 (stating that a private investigator hired by plaintiffs observed
demonstrations of live television recording at multiple retail stores. Plaintiffs owned copyrights
to some of the programs recorded and replayed as part of these demonstrations.).
123. See id. at 436 ("The Betamax operating instructions.., include a warning about
possible copyright infringement. On page 17 of the instruction booklet the following language
appears: 'Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be copyrighted.
Unauthorized recording of such material may be contrary to the provisions of the United States
copyright laws.' The Betamax machine and this accompanying booklet are delivered to the
purchaser in a sealed box.").
124. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 487-88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[A] finding of
contributory infringement has never depended on actual knowledge of particular instances of
infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant have reason to know that infringement is taking
place." (citing Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1966))).
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record copyrighted programs. 125 However, it also determined that even if
Sony knew that users were copying copyrighted works, it could not have
known, nor was it responsible for knowing, that such copying violated any
copyrights. 126 As pointed out in the Sony dissent, unwitting infringers are
not exempt from infringement liability. 127 Therefore, if such copying was
infringement, Sony's uncertainty of its legality would not absolve it of
liability. Moreover, Sony expressed awareness of the potential illegality of
such copying in the text of the Betamax operating instructions.1
28
Knowing that Betamax users were copying copyrighted programs,
Sony could only have been unaware that such activity was infringing if it
had not known that such copying was unauthorized. 29 It is implausible to
presume that all consumers who were encouraged by Betamax
advertisements to copy their favorite television programs would
individually obtain authorization from the copyright holders. However, the
court found that Sony's knowledge of copying did not equate to knowledge
of infringement because it found that unauthorized off-the-air copying of
copyrighted works for personal consumptive use was not infringement. 130
If the court had characterized such use as infringing, its acknowledgement
that Sony was aware of such use would have presumably translated into
recognition that Sony had knowledge of direct infringement by Betamax
users.
125. Id. at 426.
126. See Sony I, supra note 85, at 460 ("Plaintiffs assert, however, that these defendants
knew it was likely that people would use the Betamax to record copyrighted works and that this
constitutes constructive knowledge. Even assuming that such probability were both accurate and
sufficient to create 'constructive knowledge' of the recording of copyrighted works, these
defendants could not know that this was an infringing activity.... [Tihis court finds that home
use recording is not an infringement. Even if this finding were incorrect, defendants could not be
held responsible for knowing otherwise.").
127. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Section 504(c)(2) of the
1976 Act provides for a reduction in statutory damages when an infringer proves he 'was not
aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright,'
but the statute establishes no general exemption for those who believe their infringing activities
are legal."); see also Sony II, supra note 104, at 975 ("[T]he knowledge element is clearly
satisfied. The corporate appellees 'know' that the Betamax will be used to reproduce copyrighted
materials. In fact, that is the most conspicuous use of the product. That use is intended, expected,
encouraged, and the source of the product's consumer appeal. The record establishes that
appellees knew and expected that the Betamax's major use would be to record copyrighted
programs off-the-air.").
128. See Sony I, supra note 85, at 436.
129. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 463 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]here can be no
question that under the [Copyright] Act the making of even a single unauthorized copy is
prohibited.").
130. See Sony I, supra note 85, at 460 (holding that home use recording is not an
infringement).
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Sony materially contributed to the challenged use of the Betamax
VTR. However, neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court addressed
the material contribution element of the plaintiffs' contributory
infringement claim in much detail. This was because their mutual
conclusion on a very detailed analysis of Sony's affirmative defense
rendered the point moot.' Further, the appellate court failed to give a
detailed analysis of the material contribution element of the contributory
infringement claim. Instead, the court summarily stated that "[t]here [was]
no doubt that appellees [had] met the other requirements for contributory
infringement-inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the
infringing conduct of another."' 32 The only express analysis of the material
contribution element of the studios' contributory infringement claim is in
the Sony dissent. The Sony dissent found home television viewers were
only able to record copyrighted programs off-the-air with the aid of a VTR.
Thus, the dissent reasoned that Sony materially contributed to the
infringing activity of Betamax users by supplying consumers with the
means to record copyrighted programs off-the-air and by encouraging them
to do so.133
3. The Staple Article of Commerce Defense Should Not Have Shielded
Sony from Liability for Contributory Copyright Infringement.
At the intersection of new technology and existing copyright is a
collision of incentives; holding the innovator liable to the artist will reduce
the incentive for technical innovation, while allowing the innovator to
facilitate infringement will reduce the incentive for artistic expression.
34
131. See id. at 460-61 ( "It is also doubtful that these defendants have met the other
requirement for contributory infringement: inducement or material contribution to the infringing
activity," without other analysis, other than to reject the idea that "[s]elling a staple article of
commerce" is a material contribution to infringing use of that article.); see also, Sony III, supra
note 1, at 440 (No material contribution other than to recognize that contributory infringement
can be "predicated entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to
infringe."). The Court also discussed and rejected two other possible theories of contributory
infringement liability: control, where "the 'contributory' infringer was in a position to control the
use of the copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the
copyright owner" and inducement, where a contributory infringer "intentionally [induces] its
customers to make infringing uses of... copyrights." Id at 437, 439 n. 19.
132. Sony I supra note 104, at 975-76.
133. Sony III, supra note 1, at 490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It is only with the aid of the
Betamax or some other VTR, that it is possible today for home television viewers to infringe
copyright by recording off-the-air.... Under the circumstances, I agree with the Court of
Appeals that if off-the-air recording is an infringement of copyright, Sony has ... materially
contributed to the infringing conduct of Betamax owners.").
134. See Grokster IlL supra note 3, at 2775 (reasoning that there is tension between "values
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The "staple article of commerce" doctrine allows courts to balance these
competing interests by declining to impose secondary liability on product
distributors on the basis of product sales alone. Imposition of such liability
would have a chilling effect on innovation of products that are otherwise
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.1
35
Sony materially contributed to the challenged use of its Betamax
VTRs because its knowledge of the use of the machine by consumers was
treated as constructive knowledge of the manner in which the product was
being used. 136 However, the court ruled that knowledge of infringing use
would not be imputed to Sony based on Betamax distribution alone if the
Betamax VTR was capable of substantial noninfringing use.137 There are
two valid reasons why a charge of contributory infringement should not be
predicated entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is capable of
substantial noninfringing use. 8 First, it is not fair to impute knowledge of
an infringing use to one who distributes a product capable of a legitimate
use; the likelihood that the distributor had actual knowledge of an
infringing use is less likely where the article distributed has no legitimate
use. 139  Secondly, although decreasing illegal use has social benefits,
40
restricting public access to a device capable of lawful use may do more
harm than good.
141
of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in new
communication technologies .... The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological
innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing
the trade-off." The concern that "digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright
holders as never before... " must be weighed against the concern that "imposing liability, not
only on infringers but on distributors of software based on its potential for unlawful use, could
limit further development of beneficial technologies.").
135. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 442 ("The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike
a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-
protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce.").
136. See generally id.
137. See generally id.
138. See id. at 441-42 (stating, as the "staple article of commerce doctrine," the rule that
-[a] sale of an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also adapted to other and
lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a contributory infringer."' (quoting Henry v. A. B.
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917))).
139. See Grokster IlI, supra note 3, at 2779 (The law is "reluctan[t] to find liability when a
defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use .... ").
140. See id. at 2777 ("[W]here an article is 'good for nothing else' but infringement, there is
no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability .. " (quoting Canada v. Michigan
Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 468, 489 (6th. Cir. 1903))).
141. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 440, 44 ("When a charge of contributory infringement is
predicated entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe a
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In Sony, the Supreme Court found that home recording of televised
programs for private viewing at a time other than the time of the original
broadcast, a practice known as "time-shifting," qualified as a substantial
noninfringing use. 142  Time-shifting was held to be a "substantial" use
because the record reflected that time-shifting was the VTR's principal use.
Additionally, time-shifting was held to be a "noninfringing" use because,
although the audiovisual material recorded from live television broadcasts
was generally copyrighted, some of the copyright holders did not object to
the recording. 43  In any event, the Court determined that off-the-air
copying was a "fair" and not an infringing use. 144
If the Sony court had determined that unauthorized time-shifting of
copyrighted television programs was an infringing use of the Betamax
VTR, it could have rejected Sony's staple article of commerce defense.
The Supreme Court conceded in Grokster, "[O]f all the taping actually
done by Sony's customers, only around 9% was of the sort the Court
referred to as authorized."'' 45 The other 91% of Betamax recordings were
for purposes the Court characterized as either infringing or of uncertain
legality. 146 Such facts raise the question: what amount of noninfringing use
patent, the public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated." But "to
deprive the public of the very tool or article of commerce capable of some noninfringing use
would be an extremely harsh remedy .... ").
142. See id. at 442 ("[O]ne potential use of the Betamax plainly satisfies [the substantial
noninfringing use] standard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in
the home.").
143. See Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2788 (stating that 9%of VTR recordings were owned
by those who did not object to the recording).
144. See Sony II, supra note 1, at 442 (stating that time-shifting satisfies the substantial
noninfringing use standard).
145. See Grokster 11, supra note 3, at 2788 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The Court had before
it a survey.., showing that roughly 9% of all VCR recordings were of the type-namely,
religious, educational, and sports programming-owned by producers and distributors testifying
on Sony's behalf who did not object to time-shifting."). In fact, no evidence was presented that
any VTR recording had been expressly authorized. See Sony I1, supra note 1, at 494 n.45
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The only witness at trial who was clearly an exclusive copyright
owner and who expressed no objection to unauthorized time-shifting was the owner of the
copyright in Mister Rogers' Neighborhood. But the Court cites no evidence in the record to the
effect that anyone makes VTR copies of that program. The simple fact is that the District Court
made no findings on the amount of authorized time-shifting that takes place."). However, this
point is moot, because the staple article of commerce defense requires that an article "merely be
capable of substantial noninfringing uses." Id. at 442 (emphasis added). Therefore, the fact that
no time-shifting had actually been authorized is irrelevant.
146. See Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining that the
"buyer could use the machine for infringing purposes as well .... Or, the buyer might use the
machine to record copyrighted programs under circumstances in which the legal status of the act
of recording was uncertain.").
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qualifies such use as "substantial"? 147  One concurring opinion in the
Grokster case, joined by Justice Stevens who authored the majority's 1984
Sony opinion, suggested that "a figure like 10%... serves as an adequate
foundation where there is a reasonable prospect of expanded legitimate
uses over time."' 148 However, the majority in Grokster avoided answering
the question of how much use constitutes "substantial" use. 149 Moreover,
in Sony, the Supreme Court expressly based its decision on the findings
that: (1) a substantial number of copyright holders would not object to
time-shifting 150 and (2) there was no demonstrable evidence of harm to the
studios.' 5' The Court did not rest its decision upon a finding that 10% is a
substantial amount of use.152 If the Sony majority had accepted the studios'
argument that time-shifting was an infringing use and that they were being
deprived of the ability to exploit a substantial market for their copyrighted
works, 53 the Court could have concluded that 9% noninfringing use was
not "substantial" enough to support a staple article of commerce defense
and held Sony liable for contributory copyright infringement.1
54
147. See id. at 2778 ("The parties and many of the amici in this case think the key to
resolving it is the Sony rule and, in particular, what it means for a product to be 'capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses."' (quoting Sony Il, supra note 1, at 442)).
148. See id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
149. See id. at 2778-79 ("Assuming... 10% to be [Grokster and Streamcast's]
noninfringing use, MGM says this should not qualify as 'substantial,' and the Court should
quantify Sony to the extent of holding that a product used 'principally' for infringement does not
qualify.... It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous
understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may
be required.").
150. See id. at 2788.
151. Sony IlI, supra note 1, at 456 ("[R]espondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting
would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their
copyrighted works.").
152. See Sony IlL supra note 1, at 456 ("[T]he record and findings of the District Court lead
us to two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers
of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not object to
having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers.").
153. See id. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Studios and their amici demonstrate
that the advent of the VTR technology created a potential market for their copyrighted programs.
That market consists of those persons who find it impossible or inconvenient to watch the
programs at the time they are broadcast, and who wish to watch them at other times. These
persons are willing to pay for the privilege of watching copyrighted work at their convenience, as
is evidenced by the fact that they are willing to pay for VTRs and tapes; undoubtedly, most also
would be willing to pay some kind of royalty to copyright holders. The Studios correctly argue
that they have been deprived of the ability to exploit this sizable market.").
154. See id. at 490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Under the circumstances, I agree with the
Court of Appeals that if off-the-air recording is an infringement of copyright, Sony has ...
materially contributed to the infringing conduct of Betamax owners.").
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4. Sony Induced the Challenged Use of the Betamax VTR.
Regardless of whether the Court had accepted Sony's staple article of
commerce defense, if the Court had held unauthorized time-shifting to be
an infringing use, it could have held Sony liable for inducement of
infringement under the rule articulated in Grokster: "[O]ne who distributes
a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties."' 55 In attempting to distinguish Grokster from Sony, the Grokster
Court notes that "Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the
knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to
inge .... ,,156 Indeed, the Sony Court did state, "Sony certainly does not
'intentionally induc[]' its customers to make infringing uses of
respondents' copyrights .... , However, like its fair use analysis, the
Supreme Court's inducement analysis in Sony is flawed.
Further attempting to distinguish Grokster from Sony, the Grokster
Court explains that inducement liability requires that the requisite intent to
induce be demonstrated by objective expression and conduct, not merely
subjective knowledge.' 58  In Grokster, the evidence was damning.
StreamCast's chief technology officer had expressly stated that, as a
promotional tactic, the company had set a goal to come in conflict with the
law. 5 9 Moreover internal correspondence between StreamCast executives
manifest an objective to make more copyrighted songs available on the
Morpheus network than on rival file sharing networks. 60 Grokster went so
far as to send users a newsletter touting its ability to provide specific
copyrighted songs.' 6' In its legal analysis of these facts, the Grokster Court
highlighted three characteristics of the defendants' expression and conduct
that, combined, made them liable for inducement of infringement: (1)
"each company showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of
155. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2780.
156. Id.
157. See Sony II, supra note 1, at 439 n. 19.
158. See Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2780 ("[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or
of actual infringing uses would not be enough hereto subject a distributor to liability. Nor would
ordinary acts incident to product distribution.., support liability in themselves. The inducement
rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct ... ").
159. See id. at 2773 (discussing StreamCast's promotional campaign to capture Napster's
customers, exploit the illegal uses of its software, and "get in trouble with the law and get sued"
in order to gamer media attention).
160. Id. at 2773-74.
161. Id. at 2774.
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demand for copyright infringement,"'1 62 (2), "neither company attempted to
develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing
activity using their [products],' 163 and (3) "the extent of the [product]'s use
determines the gain to the distributors."''64 The same could be said of Sony.
As conceded by the Supreme Court in Grokster, "The classic instance
of inducement is by advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message
designed to stimulate others to commit violations." Although the Sony
Court cursorily determined that Sony did not intentionally induce its
customers to make copyright infringing use of its Betamax VTR, Sony
clearly induced its customers to put the Betamax to its challenged use.
National advertisements for the Betamax encouraged consumers to "record
favorite shows," "build a library," and record "novels for television" and
"classic movies." Betamax salesmen recorded and played back
copyrighted programs from live telecasts as part of their sales pitch, 165 even
though the operating instructions distributed with each Betamax sold
expressly stated that such recording "may be contrary to the provisions of
the United States copyright laws."'166 Sony's promotional activities catered
to a consumer that wanted to record copyrighted television programs. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the challenged Betamax use was
"intended, expected, encouraged and the source of the product's consumer
appeal."' 167 Before the Supreme Court, the dissent found that advertisement
of the Betamax's capacity to record copyrighted programs supported its
determination that Sony had induced copyright infringement. 68 Although
Sony sought to appeal to consumers who wanted to record copyrighted
television programs, the Sony majority determined that this pool of
consumers was not a source of demand for copyright infringement because
it found home recording of copyrighted television programs to be a fair,
noninfringing use of copyrighted works.1
69
Grokster never blocked anyone from using its software, even after
copyright holders warned the company about infringing use of its
162. Id. at 2781.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2782.
165. See Sony L supra note 81, at 439 (explaining that plaintiffs hired a private investigator
who observed demonstrations of live television recordings at multiple retail stores.).
166. See id. at 436.
167. See Sony I, supra note 103, at 975 ("The corporate appellees 'know' that the Betamax
will be used to reproduce copyrighted materials. In fact, that is the most conspicuous use of the
product. That use is intended, expected, encouraged, and the source of the product's consumer
appeal.").
168. See Sony Iff, supra note 1, at 489-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 456.
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software. 170 StreamCast rejected a company's offer to monitor copyright
infringing use of Morpheus software and took action to prevent would-be
monitors from accessing its network. 171  Even though Grokster and
StreamCast were aware of the copyright infringing uses of their software,
neither made an effort to diminish such use.17 2 Similarly, Sony made no
effort to inhibit use of its Betamax VTR to record copyrighted works off-
the-air. A distinguishing characteristic of the Betamax VTR was that it
contained, in one machine, all of the components necessary to record
television programs off the air. 173 VTRs had been available for years prior
to the Sony case, but VTR owners who wished to record a telecast had to
purchase a separate tuning device that would enable the VTR to pick up
television signals. 1 74  The studios did "not object to the sale of VTR's
without tuners."' 175 Therefore, an obvious solution to the conflict between
Sony and the studios would have been for Sony to remove the tuner from
its Betamax VTR. However, Sony did not remove the tuner from its
Betamax VTR, and made no indication it intended to do SO. 176 In fact,
Sony buried a concession on page seventeen of the Betamax instruction
booklet that unauthorized off-the-air recording "may be contrary to the
provisions of the United States copyright laws."' 177 Moreover, Sony did not
attach to its Betamax VTRs the plate it had attached to the back of pre-
Betamax VTRs, which stated: "This videotape recorder is not to be used to
record copyrighted works.' ' 178 Sony did not attempt to diminish off-the-air
recordings of copyrighted works with the Betamax VTR.
The Supreme Court found it significant that Grokster and StreamCast
generated revenue by selling advertising space, and that advertising
revenues increased as the number of Grokster and Morpheus users
increased. 179  The Court determined that demand for copyright
170. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2774.
171. Id. at 2774.
172. Id. at 2772.
173. See Sony I, supra note 84, at 435 (Noting that "[t]hree components are required to
record off-the-air and play back on the average television set: (a) the videotape recorder; (b) the
tuner; and (c) the radio frequency adapter" and that, "even without Betamax machines, a person
could assemble a system for off-the-air recording after purchasing the components separately[,]"
but that "Betamax machines contain all three components.").
174. Sony III, supra note 1, at 458 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 492 n.42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 458 n.1 (noting that, in addition to selling the Betamax VTR, Sony sold
VTRs without built-in turners).
177. Sony I, supra note 84, at 436.
179. Id.
179. Grokster II, supra note 3, at 2774 ("Grokster and StreamCast receive no revenue from
users .... Instead, both companies generate income by selling advertising space .... As the
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infringement enabling software was translating into dollars for Grokster
and StreamCast.180 While the fact that "the commercial sense of their
enterprise turns on high-volume use" was not, in and of itself, sufficient to
justify an inference of unlawful intent, taken together with the rest of the
evidence in the case, the Court found the Grokster defendants' "unlawful
objective" to be "unmistakable."181
Although Sony derived its revenue from direct sales rather than
advertising, the commercial sense of Sony's enterprise depended on high-
volume use of its product. Sony pitched off-the-air recording of
copyrighted telecasts as a selling point in its promotion of the Betamax
VTR.18 2  Consequently, off-the-air recording of copyrighted telecasts
became the product's principal use.1 83 Clearly, consumers were purchasing
Betamax VTRs to record copyrighted programs and Sony was profiting
from sales of the VTRs that enabled such copying.'8 If the Court had
found off-the-air recording for home use to be copyright infringement, it
would be apparent that Sony profited from that infringing use of its
Betamax.1
85
C. The Supreme Court's Fair Use Analysis in Sony Is Flawed.
From the foregoing analysis, we see that the difference in the
outcomes of the Sony and Grokster decisions has less to do with the
defendants' intentions than with the Supreme Court's finding in Sony that
unauthorized off-the-air recording of copyrighted audiovisual material for
number of users of each program increases, advertising opportunities become worth more.").
180. Id. ("Users seeking Top 40 songs, for example, or the latest release by Modest Mouse,
are certain to be far more numerous than those seeking a free Decameron, and Grokster and
StreamCast translated that demand into dollars.").
181. Id. at 2782.
182. See Sony I, supra note 81, at 439 (noting that Betamax salesmen recorded copyrighted
telecasts in their demonstrations of Betamax recording); id. at 436 (noting that national
advertising encouraged Betamax consumers to "record favorite shows").
183. See Sony II, supra note 1, at 421 ("[Findings of the District Court] reveal that the
average member of the public uses a VTR principally to record a program he cannot view as it is
being televised and then to watch it at a later time.").
184. See id. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("From the Studios' perspective, the
consequences of home VTR recording are the same as if a business had taped the Studios' works
off the air, duplicated the tapes, and sold or rented them to members of the public for home
viewing. . . . [T]he commercial benefit accrues to the manufacturer and distributors of the
Betamax.").
185. See Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2777 ("Although Sony's advertisements urged
consumers to buy the VCR to 'record favorite shows' or 'build a library' of recorded
programs... neither of these uses was necessarily infringing") (citations omitted) (quoting Sony
III, supra note 1, at 459).
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home use was a fair use of copyrighted material. 186 However, the Court's
fair use analysis in Sony is flawed. If the Court had applied the fair use
statute in a manner consistent with its literal meaning, it would not have
held the challenged use of the Betamax VTR in Sony to be a fair use.
Section 107 of the Copyright Act expressly states that the list of
factors used to determine whether a use is a fair use is not exclusive.
87
Nevertheless, the Sony Court confined its fair use analysis to consideration
of the four factors listed in Section 107: (1) the purpose and character of
the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion of the copyrighted work used; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.'8 8 An analysis of the facts of Sony, using only these four factors,
does not justify a finding that unauthorized off-the-air recording of
copyrighted works for home use is a fair use.
1. The Commercial Purpose and Non-Transformative Character of the
Challenged Use in Sony Do Not Support a Finding That It Is a Fair Use.
Sir Isaac Newton attributed his professional success as an inventor to
the fact that he "stood on the shoulders of giants." The fair use doctrine is
meant to allow authors to "stand on the shoulders" of their intellectual
predecessors without fear of liability for copyright infringement. It "acts as
a form of subsidy-albeit at the first author's expense-to permit the
second author to make limited use of the first author's work for the public
good."'189  The incorporation of elements of a copyrighted work into a
subsequent work, which "stands on the shoulders" of the original, serves
the ultimate goal of copyright law: advancement of public welfare through
promotion of the useful arts.' 90 For this reason, the fair use doctrine
excepts transformative uses from liability. 91 Its purpose is to encourage
production of derivate works, not mere substitutes for existing works.
There is nothing transformative about time-shifting; time-shifting is
186. Id. at 2788.
187. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
188. See id.
189. Sony Ilf, supra note 1, at 478 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Latman Fair Use Study
31 and Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural Analysis of the Betamax Case
and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1630 (1982)).
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
191. Courts commonly refer to uses that incorporate elements of a copyrighted work into a
work with a "further purpose or different character" as "transformative." Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
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completely "intrinsic" in character' 9 2  It involves generating an identical
copy of the original work; the fact finder in Sony conceded that the
recordings were put to the same use as the original: private consumption.
The time-shifter stands in the shoes, not on the shoulders, of the studio.
Clearly, the non-transformative character of time-shifting cuts against a
finding of fair use.'
93
Time-shifting is not a fair use because of the Betamax user's purpose
for time-shifting. Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that works that
use copyrighted material for "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching... scholarship, or research" are exempt from copyright
infringement liability.' 94 This section also asks whether a given use has a
"commercial" purpose or a "nonprofit educational" purpose; 195 commercial
uses are considered presumptively unfair.' 96 The phrase "fair use" speaks
to the defense's genesis as an exception to copyright infringement liability
for purposes of "fair and bona fide abridgment" in works of literary
criticism.97 Time-shifting in Sony was not done for the purpose of
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, or
nonprofit education.
The purpose of the time-shifting was to facilitate private consumption
of television programs at different times from their original telecasts.
98
The Sony Court correctly acknowledged that VTR-enabled copying of
copyrighted works for a "profit-making purpose" would be presumptively
unfair. 199  However, it wrongly determined that substitution of an
unauthorized recording of a studio's copyrighted work for the original did
not cut against a finding of fair use. The simple explanation for this bizarre
192. See Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega,
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/sony-galoob.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2005) ("An
intrinsic use merely consumes the work in the same way as if a copy had been purchased.").
193. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1984) ("[T]he
fair use doctrine has always precluded a use that 'supersede[s] the use of the original."' (quoting
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841))).
194. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
195. Id.
196. Sony I1, supra note 1, at 451 ("[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright.
197. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344-45 ("[Use of] the most important parts of the work, with a
view, not to criticise [sic], but to supersede the use of the original work.., will be deemed in law
a piracy.").
198. See Sony I, supra note 84, at 466.
199. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 449 ("If the Betamax were used to make copies for a
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair.").
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result was that the Court accepted the trial court's characterization of time-
shifting use as "noncommercial., 200 This was clear error.
In a separate decision issued the year after the Sony decision, the
Supreme Court explained that "[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction
is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.,,20 1  Time-shifting exploits the studios'
copyrighted material without paying the "customary price., 20 2 Home-use
copies of some of Sony's movies were available for purchase on Laser Disc
at the time of the Sony case, although it is unclear from the record whether
any of the specific titles that the defendants had copied were among those
available on Laser Disc.20 3 Therefore, the studios were concerned that
time-shifting would negatively impact the market for authorized recordings
of their copyrighted works.20 4 If Betamax users were time-shifting to avoid
purchasing authorized recordings of the studios' copyrighted works, then
their use of copyrighted works was commercial.
Even if no home-use copies of the time-shifted programs were
available for purchase at the time of the Sony case, time-shifters still sought
to exploit the studios' copyrighted works without paying the "customary
,,205th
price. Even though the Court characterized network television
broadcasts as "free, ' 2°6 the studios did not offer viewers television with no
strings attached. Time is money and what was required of viewers for the
200. See id. ("[T]he District Court's findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private
home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.").
201. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
202. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting the fair use defense where "repeated and exploitative unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies").
203. See Sony I, supra note 81, at 434 ("Within the past year, Disney has also offered some
of its theatrical motion pictures for sale on videodisc.").
204. Sony III, supra note 1, at 483 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Studios have identified
a number of ways in which VTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR recording could
reduce their ability to market their works in movie theaters and through the rental or sale of
prerecorded videotapes or videodiscs").
205. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Copyright
law] imposes upon the public certain expression-related costs in the form of(1) royalties that may
be higher than necessary to evoke creation of the relevant work, and (2) a requirement that one
seeking to reproduce a copyrighted work must obtain the copyright holder's permission. The first
of these costs translates into higher prices that will potentially restrict a work's dissemination.
The second means search costs that themselves may prevent reproduction even where the author
has no objection... [T]hese costs are, in a sense, inevitable concomitants of copyright
protection").
206. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 449 ("[T]ime-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such
a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge").
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benefit of free television, was the price of their attention so that networks,
studios, and advertisers could count their viewership.07  In turn,
advertising rates were computed based on viewerships. °8 Ultimately, the
advertising fees that the networks received determine the fees networks
paid to the studios to license their copyrighted works. 20 9  Therefore,
Betamax users were time-shifting to save the expense of having to watch
television programs at their regularly scheduled times. Thus, both the
character and the purpose of time-shifting cut against a finding of fair use.
2. The Creative Nature of the Copyrighted Material in Sony Cuts Against
a Finding of Fair Use.
Creative works are "closer to the core of intended copyright
protection" than fact-based works.210  Therefore, the law affords greater
protection to dramatic works than to merely informative works.211 The
creative nature of the works in the Sony dispute, including movies such as
"Frankenstein," "The Mummy," "Wolfnan," and "Psycho," and several
episodes of the "New Mickey Mouse Club," does not support a finding that
time-shifting was a fair use. However, rather than conceding that the
creative nature of the studios' copyrighted works does not support a fair
use defense, the Supreme Court accepted the district court's conclusion that
the most important aspect of the nature of the materials involved was that
they were telecast over public airwaves to individual homes free of
charge. 212  The fact that copyright holders authorized use of their
copyrighted works without pecuniary remuneration says nothing about the
nature of the copyrighted works. Like the district court, the Supreme Court
simply ignored the fact that the creative nature of the works being recorded
cut against a finding that time-shifting is a fair use.213
207. See Sony I, supra note 81, at 440-41 (discussing the broadcasting industry and ratings).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994)).
211. Sony III, supra note 1, at 455 n.40 ("Copying a news broadcast may have a stronger
claim to fair use than copying a motion picture."); see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1984) ("The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate
factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.").
212. Sony III, supra note 1, at 425.
213. Id. at 496 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The second factor-'the nature of the
copyrighted work'-strongly supports the view that time-shifting is an infringing use.").
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3. There Was No Fair Use of the Copyrighted Works Because Betamax
Users Copied Television Programs in Their Entirety.
According to the district court in Sony, "[T]he more substantial the
taking from the copyrighted work, the less likely it is that the fair use
defense will be available. 214 The Supreme Court in Sony also stated that
"the fact that the entire work is reproduced" ordinarily has the effect of
"militating against a finding of fair use." 215  Nevertheless, even though
time-shifting involved reproducing a copyrighted work in its entirety, both
courts rejected the obvious conclusion that the amount of the portion used
did not support a finding of fair use.2 16 Instead, the Sony Court did not
consider this factor's impact because Betamax users were invited to view
the works at no cost during their scheduled broadcast.217
It is irrelevant that time-shifters could have freely viewed the
copyrighted works that they recorded during scheduled telecasts.
Prospective television viewers were offered a "limited license" to perform,
on his or her own home television set, a studio's copyrighted work in
exchange for their attention to the program during the scheduled telecast.
If viewers rejected that offer, they had no right use the studios' works.218
214. SonyI, supra note 81 at 454.
215. Sony III, supra note 1, at 449-50; see also Campbell v. Acuf-Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
591 (1994) ("[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original,
it clearly 'supersede[s] the objects,' of the original and serves as a market replacement for it,
making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original will occur." (citation omitted) (citing
Sony III, supra note 1, at 451.)).
216. Sony III, supra note 1, at 449-50 ("[W]hen one considers... that time-shifting merely
enables a viewer to see [a copyrighted audiovisual] work which he had been invited to witness in
its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced, see § 107(3), does not have
its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use.").
217. Id.
218. The Uniform Commercial Code articulates the effect of a viewer's time-shifting of a
telecast on "negotiations" between the studios and the television viewer. Official Comment 3 to
U.C.C. § 2-206 explains, "[A]n expression of acceptance," in this case, a viewer's tuning in to a
regularly scheduled television program, "can operate as an acceptance (i.e., create a contract)
even though it contains terms that are not identical to those in the offer. This rule applies,
however, only to an expression of acceptance that is not only seasonable but also 'definite.' A
purported expression of acceptance containing additional or different terms," in this case, such as
a proposal to watch the program at a time other than during its scheduled broadcast, "would not
be a 'definite' acceptance when the offeree's expression clearly communicates to the offeror the
offeree's unwillingness to do business unless the offeror assents to those additional or different
terms. This is not a definite acceptance since the offeree's expression makes it clear that the
offeree is not 'accepting' anything; but rather that the offeree is indicating a willingness to do
business only on the offeree's terms and that the offeree is awaiting the offeror's assent to those
terms.... In a situation in which the offer clearly indicates that the offeror is unwilling to do
business on any terms other than those contained in the offer, and the offeree responds with an
expression of acceptance that contains additional or different terms, a court could also conclude
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Moreover, even if a court held that a studio forfeited its exclusive right to
perform that copyrighted work by inviting the public to view it during a
scheduled telecast, the invitation to view the work was not an invitation to
copy it.2 9  Time-shifters not only violated studios' exclusive right of
performance by replaying a copyrighted work after the original broadcast,
but they also violated studios' exclusive rights of reproduction by recording
the copyrighted work. The fact that time-shifters copied studios'
copyrighted programs in their entirety factor cuts against a finding that
time-shifting is a fair use.
4. The Fair Use Defense is Unavailable Because the Challenged Use
Impaired the Studios' Ability to Exploit the Market for Home-Use
Recordings of Their Copyrighted Works.
According to the courts, the most important statutory factor when
conducting a fair use analysis is the effect of time-shifting upon the
potential market for, or the value of, the studios' copyrighted works.220 It is
unreasonable to expect courts to be clairvoyant and fault them for making a
determination about harm to a potential market that later proves to be
wrong. However, the Sony Court can be faulted for (1) giving
disproportionate weight to a factor loaded with uncertainty while the other
three factors cut against fair use, and (2) failing to give adequate
consideration to the evidence presented by the studios.
Harm to a potential market is very difficult to prove.22' For that
reason, as the district court in Sony acknowledged, "'in the ordinary case,'
that the offeree's response does not constitute a definite expression of acceptance." U.C.C. § 2-
206 cmt. 3 (2004).
219. Sony 111 supra note 1, at 497 n.49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("An invitation to view a
showing is completely different from an invitation to copy a copyrighted work.").
220. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566-67 ("This last
factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use. 'Fair use, when properly
applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of the
work which is copied."' (quoting 1 Nimmer § 1. 10[D] at 1-87)); see also Sony III, supra note 1,
at 450-54, 456 (discussing the "harm" factor of the fair use analysis). Whereas only one
paragraph of the Supreme Court's Sony decision is devoted to consideration of the other three
factors collectively, its analysis of harm spans four pages of the opinion. Moreover, harm is
identified with authorized copying as one of the two reasons that the Court gave for accepting
Sony's staple article of commerce defense. Id.
221. See Sony III, supra note 1, at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Proof of actual harm, or
even probably harm, may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new technology is
speculative, and requiring such proof would present the 'real danger... of confining the scope of
an author's rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as the years go by, his copyright
loses much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances."' (quoting Register's
Supplementary Report 14)).
BROKEN RECORD
irreparable harm is presumed when the copyright holder's 'right to
exclusive use of copyrighted material is invaded.' ' 222  Considering that
time-shifters infringed the studios' exclusive reproduction and performance
rights, the studios should have been, at least, afforded a presumption of
harm.22 3 However, the district court in Sony insisted that Sony was "not the
'ordinary' copyright case," because the studios allowed their copyrighted
works to be telecast for public viewing without charge, thereby denying the
studios the benefit of that presumption. Accordingly, rather than leaving it
to Sony to rebut a presumption of harm to the studios, the Supreme Court
shifted to the studios the evidentiary burden of demonstrating "that time-
shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential
market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. 224
The district court in Sony was presented with compelling evidence of
harm to the potential market for the studios' copyrighted works.
Executives from both studios testified that future VTR use "would decrease
the value of their copyrights in a number of ways. 225 The court made no
conclusive finding that VTR use would not cause the studios future
harm.226 The demand for copies of the studios' copyrighted works
indicated that the VTR had increased the value of the studios' limited
monopoly rights.227 The Supreme Court implicitly conceded this point
when it stated that a time-shifter does not harm the studio because "no live
viewer would buy a prerecorded videotape if he did not have access to a
VTR. ''228 However, the Sony majority did not recognize that the plaintiffs
had demonstrated harm "simply by showing that the value of their
copyrights would increase if they were compensated for the copies that are
used in the new market., 229 Instead, the majority cited the public demand
for copies of the studios' copyrighted works as justification for violating
222. Sony I, supra note 81, at 464 (quoting Am. Metro. Enters. of N.Y., Inc. v. Warner
Bros. Records, Inc., 389 F.2d 903, 905 (2d Cir. 1968).
223. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) ("Since fair use is
an affirmative defense, its proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating
fair use without favorable evidence about relevant markets.").
224. Sony III, supra note 1, at 456.
225. Sony I, supra note 81, at 440.
226. Though it did find that "[h]arm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal,"
and that "[n]o likelihood of harm was shown at trial," the district court stopped short of finding
that time-shifting would in fact have no effect on the potential market for or value of the studios'
copyrighted works. Of course, the court has no crystal ball that would enable it to make such a
conclusive finding either way. See Sony I, supra note 81, at 467-68.
227. Sony III, supra note 1, at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 450 n.33.
229. Id. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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the studios' exclusive monopoly rights in favor of public access.230
The argument that studios suffered no harm because VTR use created
the market for recordings is flawed in two respects. First, Sony did not
object to sales of VTRs without television tuners. Instead, the demand for
copies of the studios' copyrighted works, authorized or unauthorized,
existed independently of the VTR's capacity to record off-the-air. Second,
and more importantly, "the fact that a given market for a copyrighted work
would not be available to the copyright holder were it not for the infringer's
activities does not permit the infringer to exploit that market without
compensating the copyright holder.,
231
In 1984, it was difficult to know how pervasive the home video
industry would become.232 However, the home video industry was not
"unmentioned in Sony., 233 Sony's dissent noted the studios' argument that
the studios were being deprived of the ability to exploit the "sizable
market" consisting of "those persons who find it impossible or
inconvenient to watch the programs at the time they are broadcast, and who
wish to watch them at other times. 234 The Sony dissent clearly noted that
"[a] VTR owner who has taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing will
be less likely to rent or buy a tape containing the same movie. 235 Even the
district court acknowledged that "prerecorded discs of special programs or
movies will compete with the Betamax recording. 236
D. The Inconsistency in the Grokster and Sony Decisions Is Attributable in
Part to Litigation Strategy Decisions and Policy Considerations.
While the Sony and Grokster cases are similar in many respects, there
230. Id. at 454 ("The District Court's conclusions are buttressed by the fact that to the extent
time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal
benefits."); Sony , supra note 81, at 454 (citation omitted) ("This increase in access is consistent
with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through
the public airwaves.").
231. Sony II, supra note 1, at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Iowa State Univ.
Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)).
232. See Hilary Potkewitz, Digital Verit: Studios See More Money in DVDs Than Theaters,
L.A. BUS. J., Aug. 29-Sept. 4, 2005, at 1 (quoting movie industry analyst Harold Vogel of Vogel
Capital who states, "[Y]ou don't make money in the [theatrical] release anymore-you make
most of your money on the DVD .... Even a reasonably successful picture makes most of its
real money on television and in DVD, as opposed to the theatrical release.").
233. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2790 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("There may be other now-
unforeseen noninfringing uses that develop for peer-to-peer software, just as the home-video
rental industry (unmentioned in Sony) developed for the VCR.").
234. Sony IlI, supra note 1, at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 483 n.35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
236. Sony , supra note 81, at 467.
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are important differences as well. These distinctions may have affected the
contributory infringement analysis of either case, but more importantly,
they underscore policy considerations and litigation strategy decisions that
may partly explain the difference in the outcomes of the two cases.
1. The Sony Defendants Argued That Off-The-Air Recording of
Copyrighted Works for Home Use Was Not an Infringement of Copyright,
Whereas the Grokster Defendants Conceded That Downloading Digital
Copies Violated Copyrights.
Unlike in Sony where the Court found time-shifting to be a fair use,
the Grokster Court held otherwise because Grokster and StreamCast
conceded that most file swapping constitutes a copyright infringement.237
Conversely, Sony vigorously insisted that time-shifting, the primary use of
its Betamax VTR, was not copyright infringement. Despite the fact that
Sony clearly encouraged consumers to record copyrighted audiovisual
works off-the-air as a strategy to sell the Betamax VTR, time-shifting came
before the courts as an issue of first impression.238 Sony ultimately
succeeded in convincing a majority of the Supreme Court that it did not
know that off-the-air recording of copyrighted works for home-use violated
copyrights even though the evidence suggested otherwise.239 On the other
hand, the file swapping at issue in Grokster was the subject of the high-
profile Napster case, of which Grokster and StreamCast were clearly
aware. 24  Moreover, the Grokster defendants conceded that a substantial
portion of Grokster and Morpheus software use constituted infringement.241
While defendants in both cases may have had the "object of promoting [a
237. Sony II1, supra note 1, at 454-55; Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2772.
238. See Sony , supra note 81, at 447 ("In this case, new technology has spawned a
copyright question of first impression.").
239. See id. at 436 (In the Betamax instruction booklet Sony conceded that unauthorized
recording of television programs "may be contrary to the provisions of the United States
copyright laws.").
240. See Grokster I, supra note 39, at 1032 ("Although novel in important respects, both the
Grokster and Morpheus platforms operate in a manner conceptually analogous to the Napster
system described at length by the district court in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000)."); see also Grokster IlI, supra note 3, at 2773 ("An internal e-
mail from a company executive stated: 'We have put this network in place so that when Napster
pulls the plug on their free service... or if the Court orders them shut down prior to that.., we
will be positioned to capture the flood or their 32 million users that will be actively looking for an
alternative."').
241. See Grokster , supra note 39, at 1038 ("Here, it is undisputed that Defendants are
generally aware that many of their users employ Defendants' software to infringe copyrighted
works.").
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device's] use to infringe copyright, ' 42 the Sony defendants denied having
such an objective, whereas the Grokster defendants all but conceded it.
2. Whereas Defendants in Both Cases Violated Copyright Holders'
Exclusive Right of Reproduction, the Grokster Defendants Violated Right
of Distribution.
One significant difference between the Grokster and Sony cases,
virtually unmentioned in the Grokster decision, is that the file swapping at
issue in Grokster involved violation of the copyright holder's exclusive
right of distribution as well as the exclusive right of reproduction that was
at issue in Sony.243 This issue was not addressed in the Grokster decision
because Grokster and StreamCast conceded that the primary use of their
software was infringing.244 The VTR does not implicate the right of
distribution because it does not function as a means to distribute pirated
works. File swapping software use is exponential and increases each
online user's access to pirated works every time a new user logs on to the
network. Because Grokster and Morpheus users violated the additional
right of distribution, the harm to the author's incentive was greater in
Grokster than in Sony.
3. The Sony Court's Decision Was Influenced by the Consideration of
Economic Incentives.
Perhaps the most compelling support for legalized time-shifting is the
argument that authors have sufficient incentive to create in spite of time-
shifting. The Supreme Court has held that, "[w]hen technological change
has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be
construed in light of [its] basic purpose., 245  The basic purpose of the
Copyright Act is not to enrich authors but rather, to advance public welfare
242. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2770 ("[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.").
243. See Grokster I, supra note 39, at 1034-35 ("[M]any of those who use Defendants'
software do so to download copyrighted media files, including those owned by Plaintiffs, and
thereby infringe Plaintiffs' rights of reproduction and distribution.") (citation s omitted). While
the district court did not expressly acknowledge that Grokster and Morpheus users were also
violating the right of performance, it is clear from the record of the Grokster and Napster cases
that Grokster and Morpheus users were downloading music files for the purpose of replaying
them, presumptively for personal consumptive use. See id.
244. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2772 ("Grokster and StreamCast concede the
infringement in most downloads, and it is uncontested that they are aware that users employ their
software primarily to download copyrighted files .... ") (citation omitted).
245. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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in useful arts through the talents of authors.2 46 In theory, the limited
monopoly rights granted to authors should not exceed the very minimum
necessary to motivate authors to creative action.
One consideration that appears to have influenced the Court's
decision in Sony was the financial health of the studios. The court noted
that, "copyright holders in the television industry have come to expect
substantial financial reward. ,247 In its discussion of harm to the studios, the
district court noted that Universal and Disney had been very successful in
1978, stating "[i]t was Disney's eleventh consecutive year of increased
profit and the most profitable year in history for Universal Pictures'
Theatrical Division. Universal's television revenues had increased steadily
over the three years prior to trial and Disney received its highest television
income in 1978. ' '248
The Sony court concluded that the evidence at trial did not indicate
that the "denial of monopoly power over home-use recording would
significantly dissuade authors and producers from creating audiovisual
material for television., 249 Rather, the Sony court was concerned that, if
time-shifting were restricted, "[p]ersonal economic incentive could surpass
what is necessary for encouragement and actually work against the public
by decreasing access.,, 250 However, to violate a copyright holder's limited
monopoly rights anytime the social value of dissemination outweighs the
detriment to the copyright holder would be to deprive copyright holders of
rights in their copyrighted works, precisely when they encountered those
who could afford to pay for them.
Therefore, courts should base their decisions in copyright
infringement cases on a balancing of economic incentives only if the literal
terms of the Copyright Act are ambiguous. 251 For this reason, the Grokster
Court was justified in restricting online file swapping even though the
incentive it protected by doing so was probably greater than the minimum
necessary to spur advancement in the useful arts.252 Similarly, because the
246. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see Sony I, supra note 1, at 432 ("[T]he
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."
(quoting Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156.)).
247. Sony L supra note 84, at 452.
248. Id. at 439-40.
249. Id. at 469.
250. Sony I, supra note 84, at 447.
251. See Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156.
252. Grokster 11, supra note 3, at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Much of the actual flow
of revenue to artists-from performance and other sources-is stable even assuming a complete
displacement of the CD market by peer-to-peer distribution.... It would be silly to think that
music, a cultural form without which no human society has existed, will cease to be in our world
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literal terms of the Copyright Act are straightforward with respect to off-
the-air recording of copyrighted works for personal consumptive use, it is
clear that the time-shifting in Sony violated the copyright holder's
exclusive rights of reproduction and performance. Based on the four
factors in Section 107 alone, there was no reason to find that time-shifting
was not a fair use of copyrighted material. Nevertheless, the Sony Court's
decision was clearly influenced by considerations of economic incentive.
4. The Sony Court's Decision Was Influenced by Privacy Concerns.
Another consideration that clearly influenced the Sony Court's
decision was invasion of privacy. The district court in Sony paid particular
attention to the legislative history of the Copyright Act and cited at length
to Congressional committee hearings, floor debates, and reports from the
Copyright Office.253 Of particular interest to the district court was its
perception that the Copyright Office had taken the position that off-the-air
recording at home was not copyright infringement because it was
concerned about people's right to privacy in their homes. 4  The district
court distinguished Sony on the grounds that no prior cases dealt with the
specific issue of "copying within a private home using signals beamed over
public airwaves., 255 While traditionally the courts have categorized the use
of copyrighted material as either "transformative" or "intrinsic,' 256 the
district court characterized time-shifting as neither "transformative" nor
"intrinsic," but rather, "private., 257 Its determination that "[b]ecause the
use occurs within private homes, enforcement of a prohibition would be
[because of illegal file swapping]." (quoting Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable
Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273,
351-52 (2004))). Id. ("[N]early 70% ofmusicians believe that file sharing is a minor threat or no
threat at all to creative industries." (quoting Mary Madden, Artists, Musicians, and the Internet,
Pew Internet & Am. Life Project 21 (Dec. 5, 2004),
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPArtists.MusiciansReport.pdf)).
253. See Sony I, supra note 81, at 443-46.
254. See id. at 446 ("The [Copyright] Office was an active participant in drafting, promoting
and explaining the legislation for Congress and always maintained that home-use recording is not
an infringement. . . . As Ms. Ringer testified, home recording simply cannot be controlled.
Nobody is going into anyone's home to prevent it.").
255. See id. at 449.
256. Courts commonly refer to uses that incorporate elements of a copyrighted work into a
work with a "further purpose or different character" as "transformative." See, e.g., A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); Campbell v. Accuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). Uses identical to the original are referred to as "intrinsic."
See Samuelson, supra note 192 ("An intrinsic use merely consumes the work in the same way as
if a copy had been purchased.").
257. See Sony I, supra note 81, at 454 ("Here, the use is not only noncommercial but also
private.").
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highly intrusive and practically impossible, 258 clearly impacted the Court's
decision.
Although the Sony Court acknowledged that "adequate protection of a
monopoly may require the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a
device or publication to the products or activities that make such
duplication possible, 259 its ultimate decision did not apply that principle in
the way that the Grokster Court did because it rejected Grokster and
StreamCast's defense to a contributory copyright infringement claim.26°
Ironically, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Grokster noted that there
was a recent influx in traditional infringement suits against private
individuals as an alternative to pursuing distributors of copying devices.26'
It appears that, in its zeal to protect individual privacy, the Sony Court
created a legal framework that has ultimately resulted in the very invasion
of privacy that its decision was calculated to avoid.
V. CONCLUSION
While Grokster differs from Sony in significant respects, the
difference in the outcomes of the two cases is not a result of Sony having a
pure heart. The Court's acceptance of a substantial noninfringing use
defense in Sony, and rejection thereof in Grokster, has not so much to do
with a difference in the defendants' subjective intent as it does with the
Court's own determination that off-the-air recording of copyrighted
television programs is a fair, noninfringing use of copyrighted material.
258. Id.
259. See Sony IlL supra note 1, at 442.
260. Grokster III, supra note 3, at 2776 (recognizing that "[w]hen a widely shared service or
product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected
work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious
infringement.").
261. See id. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that "since September 2003, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has filed 'thousands of suits against people
for sharing copyrighted material."' (quoting Leslie Walker, New Movement Hits Universities: Get
Legal Music, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at El.)); Id. (stating that the "number of people
downloading files fell from a peak of roughly 35 million to roughly 23 million in the year
following the first suits" and "38% of current downloaders report downloading fewer files
because of the suits." (citing Lee Rainie, et al., Pew Internet & Am. Life Project 2, 4, 6, 10 (Apr.
2004), www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPFilesharing-April-04.pdf)).
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